



## VANESSA M. MILAN

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#### FOCUS AREAS

Securities Fraud

#### EDUCATION

Lafayette College

B.A., 2016, *summa cum laude*

Temple University Beasley School of Law  
J.D., 2019, *magna cum laude*

#### ADMISSIONS

Pennsylvania

New York

USDC, Eastern District of Pennsylvania

USDC, Southern District of New York

Vanessa Milan is an associate in the Firm's Philadelphia office. Vanessa received her law degree from Temple University Beasley School of Law in 2019 and her undergraduate degrees in Government & Law and English from Lafayette College in 2016. While in law school, Vanessa served as an Articles Editor for the Temple Law Review. Prior to joining the firm, Vanessa served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Robert D. Mariani, United States District Court Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Vanessa is licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania and New York.

#### Current Cases

- Boeing Company  
This securities fraud class action arises out of Boeing's alleged misstatements and concealment of the significant safety issues with its 737 MAX airliner, which caused two horrific plane crashes. In 2011, under pressure after its main competitor developed a fuel-efficient jet, Boeing announced its own fuel-efficient jet, the 737 MAX. In its rush to get the MAX to market, Boeing deliberately concealed safety risks with its updated airliner from regulators. On October 29, 2018, the 737 MAX being flown by Lion Air malfunctioned and crashed, killing 189 people. While Boeing repeatedly assured the public that the 737 MAX was safe to fly, internally, the Company was quietly overhauling the airliner's systems in an attempt to reduce the risk of another fatal malfunction. Despite Boeing's reassurances to the public, on March 10, 2019 another 737 MAX, this time operated by Ethiopian Airlines, experienced malfunctions before crashing and killing 157 people.

Even as regulators and Congress investigated the crashes, throughout the Class Period, Boeing continued to convey to the public that the 737 MAX would return to operation while covering up the full extent of the airliner's safety issues. In December 2019, Boeing finally announced it would suspend production of the 737 MAX, causing the dramatic decline of Boeing's stock price and significant losses and damages to shareholders. Since the 737 MAX catastrophe, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has initiated a civil fraud investigation and the U.S. Department of Justice has initiated a criminal investigation into Boeing's fraudulent conduct. In February 2020, a Consolidated Class Action Complaint was filed on behalf of a putative class of investors. The complaint alleges Boeing and its former executives—including former President, CEO, and Chairman of the Board Dennis Muilenburg and CFO Gregory Smith—violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act by making false and misleading statements regarding the fatal safety issues with its 737 MAX airliner. The complaint additionally alleges violations of Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act against Dennis Muilenburg and Gregory Smith as controlling persons liable for the false and misleading statements made by Boeing.

On August 23, 2022, the Court issued an Opinion and Order denying and granting in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss, finding Plaintiffs had sufficiently pled claims against Defendants Boeing and Mueilenburg. During fact discovery, Plaintiffs filed an amended pleading, which Defendants moved to dismiss. On September 30, 2024, the Court denied the vast majority of Defendants' motion to dismiss. The case is currently in fact discovery and the parties are engaged in briefing on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

[Read Consolidated Class Action Complaint Here](#)

[Read Opinion and Order Denying and Granting in Part Motion to Dismiss Here](#)

- Celgene Corp, Inc.

This securities fraud case involves Celgene's misrepresentations and omissions about two billion dollar drugs, Otezla and Ozanimod, that Celgene touted as products that would make up for the anticipated revenue drop following the patent expiration of Celgene's most profitable drug, Revlimid.

Celgene launched Otezla, a drug treating psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis, in 2014. Celgene primed the market that Otezla sales were poised to sky-rocket, representing that Otezla net product sales would reach \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion by 2017. Throughout 2015 and 2016, Defendants represented that Celgene was on-track to meet the 2017 sales projection. As early as mid-2016, however, Defendants received explicit internal warnings that the 2017 projection was unattainable, but continued to reaffirm the 2017

target to investors. By October 2017, however, Celgene announced that the Company had slashed the 2017 guidance by more than \$250 million and lowered the 2020 Inflammatory & Immunology ("I&I") guidance by over \$1 billion. Celgene's stock price plummeted on the news.

Ozanimod, a drug treating multiple sclerosis, is another product in Celgene's I&I pipeline, and was initially developed by a different company, Receptos. In July 2015, Celgene purchased Receptos for \$7.2 billion and projected annual Ozanimod sales of up to \$6 billion despite the fact that Ozanimod was not yet approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").

Celgene told investors that it would file a New Drug Application ("NDA") for Ozanimod with the FDA in 2017. Unbeknownst to investors, however, Celgene discovered a metabolite named CC112273 (the "Metabolite") through Phase I testing that Celgene started in October 2016, which triggered the need for extensive testing that was required before the FDA would approve the drug. Despite the need for this additional Metabolite testing that would extend beyond 2017, Defendants continued to represent that Celgene was on track to submit the NDA before the end of 2017 and concealed all information about the Metabolite. In December 2017, without obtaining the required Metabolite study results, Celgene submitted the Ozanimod NDA to the FDA. Two months later, the FDA rejected the NDA by issuing a rare "refuse to file," indicating that the FDA "identifie[d] clear and obvious deficiencies" in the NDA. When the relevant truth was revealed concerning Ozanimod, Celgene's stock price fell precipitously, damaging investors.

On February 27, 2019, AMF filed a 207-page Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint against Celgene and its executives under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. On December 19, 2019, U.S. District Judge John Michael Vasquez issued a 49-page opinion sustaining AMF's claims as to (1) Celgene's and Curran's misstatements regarding Otezla being on track to meet Celgene's 2017 sales projections, and (2) Celgene's, Martin's, and Smith's misstatements about the state of Ozanimod's testing and prospects for regulatory approval.

On November 29, 2020, Judge Vasquez certified a class of "All persons and entities who purchased the common stock of Celgene Corp. between April 27, 2017 through and April 27, 2018, and were damaged thereby" and appointed Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check as Class Counsel.

On July 9, 2021, Plaintiff moved to amend the Second Amended Complaint and file the Third Amended Complaint, which alleged a new statement regarding Otezla, and added new allegations based on evidence obtained in discovery regarding Ozanimod. On February 24, 2022, Magistrate Judge James B. Clark granted the

motion to amend, which Defendants appealed.

Fact and expert discovery is completed. On September 8, 2023, Judge Vazquez issued an order denying in large part Defendants' motion for summary judgment, sending the case to trial.

Specifically, following oral argument, Judge Vazquez found that genuine disputes of material fact exist with regard to the Otezla statements, denying Defendants' motion in its entirety with respect to these statements. The Court also found genuine disputes of material fact with regard to Defendant Philippe Martin's October 28, 2017 statement related to the Ozanimod NDA, and denied Defendants' motion with respect claims based on this statement. On October 27, 2023, Defendants moved for summary judgment on one remaining issue - Defendant Celgene Corporation's scienter for corporate statements related to Ozanimod. Plaintiff opposed this motion on November 17, 2023. In October 2024, the Court denied Defendants' motion. We are now preparing for trial.

[Read Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint Here](#)

[Read Opinion Granting and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss Here](#)

[Read Opinion Granting Class Certification Here](#)  
[Click Here to Read the Class Notice](#)

- First Republic Bank

This securities fraud class action arises out of misrepresentations and omissions made by former executives of First Republic Bank ("FRB" or the "Bank") and FRB's auditor, KPMG LLP, about significant risks faced by FRB that led to its dramatic collapse in May 2023, the second largest bank collapse in U.S. history.

FRB was a California-based bank that catered to high-net worth individuals and businesses in coastal U.S. cities. Leading into and during the Class Period, FRB rapidly grew in size: in 2021 alone, FRB grew total deposits by 36% and total assets by 27%. In 2022, FRB grew by another 17%, exceeding \$200 billion in total assets. During this period, Defendants assured investors that the Bank's deposits were well-diversified and stable. Defendants also assured investors that they were actively and effectively mitigating the Bank's liquidity and interest rate risks.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to disclose material risks associated with the Bank's deposit base and with respect to Defendants' management of liquidity and interest rate risk. In contrast to Defendants' representations regarding the safety and stability of FRB, the Complaint alleges that Defendants relied on undisclosed sales practices to inflate the Bank's deposit and loan growth, including, for example, by offering abnormally low interest rates on long-duration, fixed-rate mortgages in exchange for clients making checking deposits. And contrary to Defendants'

representations that they actively and responsibly managed the Bank's interest rate risk, the Complaint details how Defendants continually violated the Bank's interest rate risk management policies by concentrating the Bank's assets in long-duration, fixed rate mortgages. In 2022, when the Federal Reserve began rapidly raising interest rates, the Bank's low-interest, long-duration loans began to decline in value, creating a mismatch between the Bank's assets and liabilities. Internally, FRB's interest rate models showed severe breaches of the Bank's risk limits in higher rate scenarios, and Defendants discussed potential corrective actions at risk management meetings. However, Defendants took no corrective action, continued to mislead investors about the Bank's interest rate risk, and only amplified the Bank's risk profile by deepening the Bank's concentration in long-duration loans.

On October 14, 2022, investors began to learn the truth when FRB announced financial results for the third quarter of 2022, which showed that rising interest rates had begun to impact the Bank's key financial metrics and that the Bank had lost \$8 billion in checking deposits. Despite these trends, Defendants continued to reassure investors that Bank's deposits were well-diversified and stable, that FRB had ample liquidity, and that rising interest rates would not limit the growth in FRB's residential mortgage loan business. In FRB's 2022 annual report (released in February 2023, and audited by KPMG), Defendants further claimed that, despite the Bank's increasing interest rate risks, the Bank possessed the ability to hold its concentrated portfolio of long-duration loans and securities to maturity. The undisclosed risks materialized further on March 10, 2023, when peer bank Silicon Valley Bank failed and FRB experienced massive deposit withdrawals of up to \$65 billion over two business days, constituting over 40% of the Bank's total deposits. Defendants did not reveal these catastrophic deposit outflows to the market and instead reassured investors regarding the Bank's liquidity position. In the ensuing weeks, FRB's financial position unraveled further, resulting in multiple downgrades by rating agencies, and additional disclosures regarding the magnitude of FRB's deposit outflows and the Bank's worsening liquidity position. On May 1, 2023, FRB was seized by regulators and placed into receivership. These disclosures virtually eliminated the value of FRB's common stock and preferred stock.

On February 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a 203-page complaint on behalf of a putative class of investors who purchased FRB common stock and preferred stock, alleging violations of Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Defendants moved to dismiss. Additionally, the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, acting as receiver for First Republic Bank, intervened as a non-party and filed a separate motion challenging the Court's jurisdiction. Briefing on these motions was completed last year, and the Court held oral argument on April 17, 2025. On June 10, 2025, the Court granted the FDIC's motion and dismissed the case.

with prejudice. The Court ruled that the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) stripped the Court of subject matter jurisdiction due to an administrative exhaustion requirement. The Court did not address Defendants' motions to dismiss related to the sufficiency of the allegations under the Exchange Act. Plaintiffs have the right to appeal the Court's order

- FMC Corporation

This securities fraud class action arises out of defendants' representations and omissions made regarding the demand for FMC's suite of crop protection products during the COVID-19 pandemic and afterwards. As the realities of supply chain disruptions gripped the world, FMC's distribution partners sought to purchase as much product as possible. Beginning in 2020 and stretching into 2022, FMC welcomed this boom in sales across all of its products, including its flagship diamide insecticides.

While this dynamic of extensive overbuying was well known within the Company, investors were kept in the dark as to this practice, which did not represent a new baseline of demand, but would predictably tail off and then cannibalize FMC's future sales. At the same time, FMC's diamide insecticides were facing increasing competition from generics being sold at a fraction of the price. In spite of the knowledge that inflated sales trends in 2020 and 2021 were unsustainable, FMC sought to convince the public that the high sales numbers were a new normal with no signs of slowing down, and that generic competition was only a worry in the distant future.

Plaintiffs allege defendants made repeated representations throughout the Class Period that demand for the Company's products was robust, and that growth from recent years would continue. However, by 2022, demand for FMC's products was declining precipitously, as distributors, retailers and end-users held overstuffed inventories and dramatically slowed their buying. This continued into 2023, despite FMC's extraordinary efforts to jumpstart sales, including through costly incentives and credit arrangements. Then on May 2, 2023, FMC announced to the public that it was lowering its growth expectations for the coming quarter, but still assured investors that there were no further issues to report. On July 10, 2023, FMC again revised down its revenue and EBITDA outlooks for the year, still without disclosing the realities of its demand environment. Then on September 7, 2023, Blue Orca Capital published a report detailing its claim that FMC had "concealed from investors" the deterioration of its core business, creating an "inescapable cycle" of falling revenues, plummeting cash flows and declining profits. The story was not fully unraveled until late October 2023, when FMC admitted to investors that it expected the destocking of client warehouses to extend into

2024, and that its cratering sales numbers and cash flow had driven the Company to renegotiate its credit agreements and begin a full restructuring of its Brazilian operations, the Company's single largest sales region for the past five years. On July 17, 2024, plaintiffs filed a 186-page complaint on behalf of a putative class of investors who purchased FMC common stock between February 9, 2022 and October 30, 2023, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. On September 17, 2024, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Briefing on the defendants' motion is now complete and pending before the court.

- Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.

This securities fraud class action case arises out of Goldman Sachs' role in the 1Malaysia Development Berhad ("1MDB") money laundering scandal, one of the largest financial frauds in recent memory.

In 2012 and 2013, Goldman served as the underwriter for 1MDB, the Malaysia state investment fund masterminded by financier Jho Low, in connection with three state-guaranteed bond offerings that raised over \$6.5 billion. Goldman netted \$600 million in fees for the three bond offerings—over 100 times the customary fee for comparable deals.

In concert with Goldman, Low and other conspirators including government officials from Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates ran an expansive bribery ring, siphoning \$4.5 billion from the bond deals that Goldman peddled as investments for Malaysian state energy projects. In actuality, the deals were shell transactions used to facilitate the historic money laundering scheme. Nearly \$700 million of the diverted funds ended up in the private bank account of Najib Razak, Malaysia's now-disgraced prime minister who was convicted for abuse of power in 2020. Other funds were funneled to Low and his associates and were used to buy luxury real estate in New York and Paris, super yachts, and even help finance the 2013 film "The Wolf of Wall Street."

AP7 filed a 200-page complaint in October 2019 on behalf of a putative class of investors alleging that Goldman and its former executives, including former CEO Lloyd Blankfein and former President Gary Cohn, violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act by making false and misleading statements about Goldman's role in the 1MDB fraud. As alleged, when media reports began to surface about the collapse of 1MDB, Goldman denied any involvement in the criminal scheme. Simultaneously, Goldman misrepresented its risk controls and continued to falsely tout the robustness of its compliance measures. Following a series of revelations about investigations into allegations of money laundering and corruption at 1MDB, Goldman's stock price fell precipitously, causing significant losses and damages to the

Company's investors.

In October 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that Goldman's Malaysia subsidiary had pled guilty to violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") which criminalizes the payment of bribes to foreign officials, and that Goldman had agreed to pay \$2.9 billion pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement. This amount includes the largest ever penalty under the FCPA.

On June 28, 2021, The Honorable Vernon S. Broderick of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York sustained Plaintiff's complaint in a 44-page published opinion. On July 31, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to conform the pleadings to the evidence adduced during discovery, which is now complete.

Plaintiff first moved for class certification in November 2021. While that motion was pending, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint and subsequently ordered that Plaintiff's motion for class certification be newly briefed in light of the amended pleading. On September 29, 2023, Plaintiff renewed its motion for class certification. On April 5, 2024, Magistrate Judge Katharine H. Parker of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a 59-page Report and Recommendation recommending that the District Court grant Lead Plaintiff AP7's motion to certify the class. Meanwhile, expert discovery is ongoing.

[Read Third Amended Class Action Complaint Here](#)

[Read Opinion and Order Granting and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss Here](#)

[Read the Report and Recommendation on Motion for Class Certification Here](#)

### News

- April 9, 2024 - Kessler Topaz Achieves Class Certification Win in 1MDB Fraud Suit Against Goldman Sachs
- September 13, 2023 - New Jersey Federal Court Hands Kessler Topaz Significant Summary Judgment Win, Sends Celgene Investors' Claims to Trial